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mediaeval England; Kirsi Salonen analyses the distribution of marital cases in two years of
activity by the consistorial court of Freising in the fifteenth century; and Mia Korpiola teases
out surprisingly detailed information from the episcopal registers of the Linköping bishop Hans
Brask (1522 to 1527). Anu Lahtinen demonstrates that there is a rich seam of intimate and
detailed evidence to be recovered in personal correspondence from the sixteenth century in
Scandinavia, and Cecilia Cristellon and Silvana Seidel Menchi analyse the evidence of several
Italian courts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In a final chapter Charles Donahue
provides important methodological considerations concerning the kinds of evidence that can
be brought to bear in the study of marriage and brings his immense knowledge of European
law and the practice of European courts to a discussion of the preceding twelve chapters of the
book.
The quality of the contributions to this volume is uniformly high and every contribution
contains new and sometimes startling information. As usual, Brill have produced a high-quality
volume which is excellently copyedited and printed. Given the general interest of the subjects
covered it is a pity that the volume is so expensive. It could have provided much teaching
material had it been available at a lower price.
Frederik Pedersen
University of Aberdeen
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Anver M Emon, ISLAMIC NATURAL LAW THEORIES
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2010. x + 222 pp. ISBN 9780199579006. £55.
It is commonly said that a striking difference between the Western and Islamic philosophical
and jurisprudential traditions is the absence of natural-law thought in the Islamic world. This
book contests that traditional view – and supports its case with detailed expositions of the key
Muslim writings in the natural-law tradition. After this book, pronouncements on the subject
will never be the same again.
The author’s definition of natural law may be stated simply. It is the thesis that the study
of the natural world can yield important truths in the realm of morals and values, outside of
any explicit religious framework. Divinity is not altogether absent from this picture, for it is
conceded that, as the original creator of the world, God must be in some sense ultimately
responsible for nature and its laws. But the generic natural-law thesis holds that God created
the world in such a way as to make it possible for humans to apply their powers of reason to the
study of that world and directly to discover important moral, ethical and even religious truths
from it.
This basic natural-law belief contrasts with voluntaristic philosophies and theologies, which
stress the free, arbitrary will of God as the source of all values –with that will being discoverable
exclusively through revelation rather than through study of the natural world. This is the
predominant philosophy – or at least theology – of the Islamic world, in the form of the
’Asharite theology, which is strongly voluntaristic and providentialist, ascribing each and every
occurrence, however minute, to the conscious will of God. The natural-law outlook also
contrasts with the secular philosophies of the positivist stripe, which maintain that there is
no connection between the physical world and the realm of human values.
The author of this book not only insists, in great detail, on the existence of natural-law
thought in the Muslim world. He goes on to characterise it as coming in two principal versions,
which he calls “hard” and “soft” natural law. These two approaches were in agreement as to the
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existence of a close bond between the physical and moral worlds. But they differed as to the
nature and origin of that link. The hard natural lawyers held, broadly, that the affinity between
the two realms is an inherent and inevitable feature of our universe. God could not have created
the universe in any other fashion because a world in which nature and morals were not linked
would be an imperfect one – and it is not in God’s nature to create an imperfect world. The soft
natural lawyers, in contrast, maintained that the physical-moral linkage was not inevitable, that
it was a free gift by God who was entirely at liberty to create the world in any other manner if he
so chose. The hard natural lawyers, they contended, were in error in imposing their standards
of rationality onto God. The author’s account of the contentions between these two schools of
thought – plus that of the voluntarists who opposed both of them– is a masterfully clear, as well
as thorough and detailed.
Three jurists are placed in the category of hard natural law, none of whom features in any
detail in standard Western treatments of Islamic law and philosophy. These are Abu¯ Bakr
al-Jassa¯s (tenth century), ’Abd al-Jabba¯r (late tenth and early eleventh centuries) and Abu¯
al-Husayn al-Basrı¯ (also late tenth and early eleventh centuries). A careful exposition of the
writings of each of these three is provided. It is noted that these writers, ’Abd al-Jabba¯r most
of all, had connections with the theological school known as the Mu’tazilites, who were broadly
of a rationalistic outlook. The views lost out in the course of the Middle Ages to the dominant
’Asharite theologians. The author is careful, however, to caution against making too ready or
facile an association between Mu’tazilite theology and hard natural law.
The principal adherents of soft natural law are decidedly better known, at least to Western
audiences. Chief among them was the renowned philosopher and theologian – and jurist – Abu¯
Ha¯mid al-Ghaza¯lı¯, of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, who had a powerful impact
on Western scholastic theology under the Latin cognomen of “Al Gazel.” Another eminent
proponent of soft natural law was Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯, also a noted philosopher, theologian
and lawyer (though not to be confused with his more famous namesake, who was a physician,
alchemist and philosopher of the ninth and tenth centuries). An important feature of soft
natural law thought was its reliance on maslaha, which refers basically to the purpose or goal
which the law is to serve. The concept has had an important influence in recent centuries, at
the hands of reformers who have deployed it to update the Islamic Shar’ia, or sacred law, to
make it more relevant to modern challenges.
No attempt is made at a comparative study of natural law, i.e., to determine how theMuslim
natural lawyers, hard or soft, resembled or differed from their Western European counterparts.
On this point, it will perhaps suffice to say, for present purposes, that the Muslim natural
lawyers always saw their central purpose as being to determine the content of God’s will in
situations in which scriptural authority was lacking. In this sense, there was a strong current
of voluntarism even in the natural lawyers (both hard and soft). Western natural lawyers, in
contrast, such as Thomas Aquinas, were more prepared to concede a wholly autonomous role
to natural law – and even to state explicitly that God himself was powerless to alter it. The
views of Aquinas and his followers were therefore “harder” than those of even the hard Muslim
natural lawyers. (The soft natural lawyers strongly denied that God could be under any such
constraints.)
The book is a marvelously lucid, as well as highly learned, exposition of lines of thought that
are very little known, as yet, to Western scholars. From the standpoint of lay readers, the book
would have benefited from a comprehensive glossary or index of Arabic terms, many of which
are technical terms of jurisprudence or theology. These figure strongly in the exposition, and it
is not always easy for the reader to locate the first use, as a reminder to what is being discussed.
There are, however, indexes of concepts and of names, both of which are useful.
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In sum, this is an excellently written book which sheds a world of fresh light onto Islamic
philosophy and jurisprudence. Every future consideration of natural law in the Islamic world
will have to take full account of this masterful work, and all future students of this subject will
be deeply in Professor Emon’s debt.
Stephen C Neff
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 17 pp 444-445
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COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU. COMMENTARY ON STATUTE AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE. Ed B Wägenbaur
Oxford: Hart (www.hartpub.co.uk), 2013. lxxiv + 921 pp. ISBN 9781841139951. £165.
In this review, I explain the purpose and describe the content of this book. I then go on to
present a few critical observations.
The primary remit of this book is to provide an exposition of the rules of law that govern
the legal processes before the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter the
CJEU). This exposition, moreover, is not intended to be simply a consolidated compendium
of these rules, but to alert the reader to interesting and important matters associated with their
formation. Indeed, at the outset, adverting to the well-recognised instrumental role the EU
(more generally) has played in securing peace and stability in late 20th century Europe (and
beyond), Wägenbaur provocatively states that “[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union is
thus much more than a supranational judicial instance: it serves the unity of EU law and is a
major player in a vital peacekeeping mission. . . This requires an elaborate judicial system with
a variety of legal remedies governed by specialized procedural rules” (v). The secondary remit
of this book is thus to tease out the salient historical, normative, and comparative dimensions
that underpin the CJEU’s rules of procedure – providing commentary which serves as food for
thought for those interested in the practice and theory of judicial governance in the EU.
As a preliminary observation, and the most immediately apparent, the rules of procedure of
the CJEU are presented systematically and comprehensively. To those already accustomed to
the study of these rules, the Statute of the Court of Justice (SCJ) and the Rules of Procedure
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (RPCJ) are familiar doctrinal terrain, which
are central to the analyses presented here. Yet as Wägenbaur correctly notes, the rules of
procedure which govern the legal processes before the CJEU are derived from an expansive
array of formal and informal sources –what he refers to as the “three regulatory levels” (1-9).
“Primary Law” includes: the EU’s Treaties; the SCJ (Protocol No.3 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU)); and general principles of law,
including fundamental rights and general principles of law found in the CJEU’s jurisprudence,
the legal systems of the Member States of the EU, and international law. “Secondary Law”
relates exclusively to the rules of procedure adopted by the Council of Ministers and the CJEU
through the special legislative procedure provided for in Article 253 (6) TFEU, Article 254 (5)
TFEU, Articles 63 and 64 SCJ, and Article 7 Annex I SCJ. The third and remaining sources of
law relate to the informal codes of practice issued by the CJEU informally, and the case law of
the CJEU. The doctrinal exposition of the CJEU’s rules of procedure is thus not merely limited
to the familiar sources of procedural law, but any rule of law that in some way and to some
degree influences the legal processes before the CJEU. The systematic and comprehensive
nature of this exposition is further exemplified by considering the rules of procedure relevant
to all three “judicial instances” of the CJEU, which are: the European Court of Justice (ECJ);
